Fritz v. Washoe County, 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 57 (Aug. 4, 2016) by Folkestad, Jessie
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries Law Journals
2016
Fritz v. Washoe County, 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 57 (Aug.
4, 2016)
Jessie Folkestad
Nevada Law Journal
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
This Article is brought to you by Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law, an institutional repository administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the
William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact david.mcclure@unlv.edu.
Recommended Citation
Folkestad, Jessie, "Fritz v. Washoe County, 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 57 (Aug. 4, 2016)" (2016). Nevada Supreme Court Summaries. Paper 994.
http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/994
1 
 
Fritz v. Washoe County, 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 57 (Aug. 4, 2016)
1
 
 
PROPERTY: INVERSE CONDEMNATION 
 
Summary 
 
This case involved the question of whether a counties’ approval of subdivision maps and 
street dedications which included flood channels constituted inverse condemnation where the 
plaintiff’s property flooded as a result. The Supreme Court of Nevada adopted a six part element 
test for inverse condemnation, and determined that genuine issues of material fact existed as to 
whether the County’s actions constituted substantial involvement in the drainage system 
sufficient to deem it public use. 
 
Background 
 
 Appellants purchased property neighboring a creek in Washoe County, Nevada known as 
White’s Creek. Prior to the Appellants purchase, Washoe County approved maps for an upstream 
development, and approved maps for a separate upstream development after the Appellants 
purchased the property. The County later accepted various street dedications that incorporated 
drainage systems, which diverted water to Whites Creek. Since the construction of these 
developments, the Appellants’ property has flooded during rainstorms. 
 
 Appellants filed for inverse condemnation against Washoe County alleging that the 
County’s approval of the maps and acceptance of the drainage system dedication that diverted 
water to Whites Creek, caused the flooding to their property. Appellants alleged that this conduct 
constituted substantial involvement in events that caused the taking of their property. The County 
sought summary judgment arguing that the Appellants lacked standing for maps it approved 
prior to Appellants owning the property, and also argued that the conduct pertaining to the maps 
after the purchase of the property was not substantial enough to give rise to inverse 
condemnation. In opposing the motion, the Appellants attached documents detailing the 
County’s involvement. 
 
 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the County finding approval of 
subdivision maps and acceptance of dedications did not amount to substantial involvement 
sufficient to support a claim for inverse condemnation.  
 
Discussion 
 
Standing 
 
 The County contended that the Appellants did not have standing because the County 
approved most of the subdivision maps prior to the Appellants’ purchase of the land. The 
Appellants argued that their property was taken by flooding as a result of heavy rain during their 
ownership. Since, takings claims lie with the party who owned the property at the time the taking 
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occurred,
2
 and the district court’s order failed to determine when the taking occurred; the Court 
concluded a genuine issue of material fact remained as to the issue of standing.  
 
Substantial involvement 
 
 The district court found that the County did approve the maps along with certain 
dedications; however the court found that this was insufficient to constitute substantial 
involvement giving rise to a claim for inverse condemnation. However, the Appellants presented 
evidence that the County also directed a developer to divert water north into Whites Creek. 
Appellants argued that those actions cumulatively constituted substantial government 
involvement in public activities, which led to an increase in the flow of water in Whites Creek 
causing flooding on their property.  
 
 As the elements of inverse condemnation had not previously been set forth, the Supreme 
Court of Nevada held the elements to be as follows: 1) a taking 2) of real or personal interest in 
private property 3) for public use 4) without just compensation being paid 5) that is proximately 
caused by a governmental entity 6) that has not instituted formal proceedings.
3
 Moreover, 
although a private party cannot recover in inverse condemnation for property taken by another 
private party, when a private party and government entity act in concert, government 
responsibility arises when the government entity was substantially involved “in the development 
of private lands for public use which unreasonably injured the property of others.”4 In County of 
Clark v. Powers, the government acted with various private parties to cause large amounts of 
water to be cast upon the property of the plaintiff landowners.
5
  
 
In arriving at its decision, the district court distinguished the present case from Powers 
because unlike in Powers, the government conduct could not be described as physical 
involvement directly attributable to the government entity.
6
 The Supreme Court of Nevada 
agreed with the district court that the facts of Powers were distinguishable from the facts of this 
case. However, the Supreme Court of Nevada found that this distinction was not dispositive of 
the appeal because although mere planning is insufficient to constitute substantial involvement, 
the range of actions that can constitute substantial involvement are not limited to physical 
engagements. 
 
 The district court also relied in part on Ullery v. Contra Costa County in addressing a 
novel question of law:
 7
 “Whether government activities short of physical labor, but with more 
engagement than mere planning, can constitute substantial involvement in a private development 
sufficient to constitute public use in support of inverse condemnation.” In Ullery, the court 
recognized that a public use cannot be demonstrated by mere subdivision map approval and drew 
a distinction between merely approving subdivision maps and taking other actions, including 
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accepting dedications. The Supreme Court of Nevada, however, held that the district court 
misapplied Ullery. Instead the Court distinguished Ullery from the present case, because the 
Appellants alleged the County did more than merely approve subdivision maps, it also accepted 
dedications and entered into agreements to direct water to certain areas. Thus, summary 
judgment was improper.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 In reversing the district court, the Supreme Court of Nevada found that under the newly 
adopted six element test, genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the County’s 
actions constituted substantial involvement in the drainage system sufficient to deem it public 
use.
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